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waged between medical professionals and policy 
makers opposed to a local service on one side and a 
handful of policy actors advocating for a local service 
on the other. Those in favour of a local radiation therapy 
service harnessed a sense of localism to project the 
perception of widespread community support for the 
proposal and secured funding commitments during the 
2010 Federal Election campaign.
Conclusions: There is evidence of bounded rationality 
from both the stakeholder and patient groups, as well 
as a strong sentiment of localism expressed by patients 
and community advocates. Through understanding this 
particular case, health service managers can determine 
how to better time and target messages to the general 
public and to policy makers during periods of proposed 
changes to health services.
Key words: radiation therapy services; health service 
management
Abstract
Objective: Describes where bounded rationality and 
localism are evident in the debate over the introduction 
of radiation therapy services in North West Tasmania 
and how this affected the delivery of the message from 
each side.
Design: Semi-structured interviews with stakeholders 
and patients/family over an eight month period in 2016 
are contrasted with viewpoints identified via document 
analysis.
Setting: North West Tasmania.
Main Outcome Measures: The mechanisms for policy 
change and the policy beliefs of each side are examined 
with the intention of understanding how bounded 
rationality and a sense of localism can combine to effect 
policy change.
Results: In the instance of radiation therapy services in 
North West Tasmania, a policy debate was originally 
introduction
In essence, ‘bounded rationality involves the decision-
maker choosing an alternative intended not to maximise his 
values but to be satisfactory or good enough…(it) enables 
the administrator faced with a decision to simplify by not 
examining all possible alternatives’. [1, p.84] The concept 
of bounded rationality has been used to describe how 
information is sourced and prioritised in order to allow 
policy decisions to be made. Individuals are considered to be 
‘boundedly rational’, in that they wish to achieve a particular 
policy outcome but may be unsure of how to achieve this or 
how to process all the information relevant to the issue. [2] 
Originally pioneered by Simon, [3] bounded rationality rests 
on several principles, which include that people intend to be 
rational but cognitive and emotional limitations may make 
them act in non-rational ways, and that limited attention 
spans can lead people to choose whichever option is ‘good 
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enough’ to meet the minimum aspirational level they have 
attached to the issue.
The debate over the introduction of radiation therapy 
services into the North West (NW) Tasmanian region is an 
example of conflicting priorities: a community desire for 
more local services versus a stakeholder desire for more 
centralised services. Prior to 2016 the NW of Tasmania did 
not have a radiation therapy services and patients from this 
region were referred to Launceston or Hobart. A media-
driven representation of a community desire to have a 
regional radiation therapy service began to find traction 
during the 2000s. It was not until the Federal Election 
campaign of 2010 that funding was finally committed, in 
the highly marginal electorate of Braddon, which allowed 
the service to be built. [4]
The community desire for a local radiation therapy service 
could be seen as reflecting a deep sense of localism. Localism 
can result from a sense of shared identity and encourages 
members of the community to become involved in decision-
making on issues of local significance. [5] Engagement of 
the local community in decision-making could achieve, or 
add to, a balance between government and community 
needs or expectations.
The community desire for a local service was expressed 
in several ways, largely via media articles, a petition and 
a public forum held in 2010. This desire was in contrast to 
repeated statements by the medical community that a local 
service was not safe, sustainable or warranted [6-8] and by 
the State Government that the service needed to be fully 
funded before it could be considered sustainable. [9, 10] It 
was also in contrast to the perceived need for such a service 
by the medical community, given the small population 
size. [6] However, as discussed by Cairney, [11] efforts by 
any scientific community to challenge a proposed change 
based on technical or scientific evidence will fail unless two 
realities are achieved: that policymakers will never think like 
scientists; and that there is no point in the policy-making 
process where scientific evidence can be introduced to 
manifestly impact the result.
Stakeholders, patients and family members were 
interviewed to determine if examples of bounded rationality 
and a sense of localism were evident and contrasted these 
to the viewpoints stated in documents from the period of 
the policy debate. By aligning major actors with a particular 
side of the policy debate, this research examined the 
reasons behind the use of bounded rationality, the interplay 
between bounded rationality and localism, and how the 
medical community and State Government might have 
used an understanding of bounded rationality to better 
target their message to the general public.
Methods
To identify and understand instances of bounded rationality 
and localism, evidence was sourced from both semi-
structured interviews and document analysis. Documents 
were sourced from databases, search engines and manual 
searches and were limited to the year 2000 onwards in order 
provide a full decade of debate and consistency to develop 
prior to the funding commitment made in 2010. Documents 
included journal articles, government and non-government 
documents, Hansard, media articles, and media releases and 
statements made by political candidates, representative 
bodies and other stakeholders.
Interviews were conducted in 2016 with stakeholders, as 
well as patients and family members from NW Tasmania. 
A total of 38 participants were interviewed, comprising 15 
stakeholders in 14 interviews, with one interview involving 
an additional last minute participant, and 16 patients and 
seven family members across 18 interviews, where some 
spouses were interviewed together and one family member 
was interviewed without the patient present. Ethics approval 
was received from the Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Tasmania).
Stakeholders were initially identified from the document 
analysis and invited by letter to participate in an interview. 
Purposive snowball sampling was then used to identify 
further possible participants. Stakeholders included health 
bureaucrats, medical professionals, elected representatives, 
non-government organisation representatives and 
committee members. Questions related to the identification 
of actors and policies that impacted on the design and 
delivery of cancer services.
An opt-in system was used for recruitment of cancer 
patients and family, with advertising displayed in the 
local newspapers, health centres and community centres. 
Interested parties could then contact to express interest in 
participating. Participants were restricted to those over the 
age of 18 who were or had been a diagnosed cancer patient
or were the direct family member or carer of a patient. 
Questions asked during interviews related to the accessibility 
of the system and suggestions for improving accessibility.
Interview transcripts and documents were read and 
stakeholders were grouped by profession, with patients 
forming a separate group. These groups were then analysed 
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to determine the major beliefs held by each, which were 
then examined for any perceived instance of boundedly 
rational behaviour or an expressed sense of localism.
This process involved establishing the scientific evidence 
presented on the case for radiation therapy services in NW 
Tasmania and comparing this with the beliefs and actions 
of policymakers and the local community and the stated 
rationale for these.
Results
The document analysis and interviews provide preliminary 
evidence of one coalition only, constituting state 
health policy actors – including health bureaucrats or 
representatives of the State Government – and the health 
profession. This coalition was bound together by three 
distinct beliefs:
1.  Safety and Sustainability: patient safety is  
 compromised if a service cannot be sustained  
 financially or properly resourced.
The cancer instance in Tasmania is increasing because 
of an ageing population but it hasn’t gotten to the level 
where it would sustain four linear accelerators in the north 
of the state, it will only sustain just under three. So one of 
the machines in Launceston will close down and the one in 
Burnie will open. (Stakeholder 5)
The viability and safety of an isolated single machine 
radiation oncology unit in the north-west will become a 
possibility when the critical mass of high specialised staff 
is achieved at the Launceston General Hospital’s Holman 
Clinic with its third linear accelerator, if cancer rates grow 
as projected, and if referrals of people with cancer for 
radiation oncology reach the nationally recommended 
rate of 52.3 per cent. [12, p.45-46]
2.  Recruitment and Retention: recruiting and retaining  
 specialist medical staff is an issue for the NW and  
 would impact sustainability.
It is expected to be more difficult to recruit to the North West 
Coast and one of the potential risks with a new North West 
centre is that specialised staff attracted to this area may 
come from within the existing staff at the LGH. This may 
produce a situation where both centres are understaffed. 
[13, p.2]
The major difficulty will be the recruitment and retention 
of the highly specialised staff necessary to implement and 
maintain the service. Such a service requires radiation 
oncologists, specialised nurses, radiation therapists, 
engineers, medical physicists and other technical staff. All 
of these personnel are in short supply in Australia. [6]
3.  Travel, Transport and Accommodation: providing  
 assistance for patients to travel was a solution to lack 
of access. 
I actually don’t think that distance in Tasmania is a 
critical  issue… if people have greater awareness and 
understanding then the very small distances that we 
need to travel in Tasmania pale into insignificance. 
(Stakeholder 3B)
But there are still patients who still need to travel… So if 
they do have to travel it’s about policy decisions making 
it easier for them to stay overnight and their support 
person. So it’s about equity of access not equality of 
access. (Stakeholder 6)
These beliefs showed a focus on the machinations of 
delivering a radiation therapy service and the prioritisation 
of patient care over geographic accessibility. These beliefs 
were demonstrated through evidence on the need for a 
service and the capacity for it to be delivered in terms of 
human and financial capital, rather than emotive statements.
What the results did not show, however, was any indication 
of a competing coalition. There were some shared beliefs 
amongst members of the community around travel being 
a burden and around the notion of equity. However, there 
was no group who advocated consistently for a regional 
service and came together in non-trivial action. There was 
one person who organised a petition and a forum. There 
was one journalist who wrote at least 18 articles framing the 
issue as one of great importance to the NW and involving 
significant community involvement:
The cancer centre fight is an example of how the politics 
and lobbyists with vested interests can stack the argument. 
Politicians did not expect everyone in the region almost 
to a man, woman and child to back up time and again 
and refuse to budge from a collective demand to have the 
cancer centre built in Burnie. [14, p.10]
However, their efforts were made in isolation to each other 
and with no evidence of community involvement. So how 
can there be a major change in policy, designed to serve the 
needs of the community, when no community demand is 
evident? The results suggest that bounded rationality may 
have guided policy decision-making in order to facilitate 
community expectations.
This is highlighted by one member of a non-government 
organisation involved in cancer services, who stated: 
‘There have been times when politics have overridden really 
what is in the best interests of the client…elections have forced 
particular policies to be enacted.’ (Stakeholder 2) 
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Another, being a senior specialist, stated:
 ‘…money has been inappropriately apportioned to 
different bits of the state which means that they can’t 
actually provide any proper service anywhere…those sorts 
of policy decisions are absolutely nonsense.’ (Stakeholder 
3A) 
The results also showed some strong signs of localism 
amongst the NW community, even if it was not necessarily 
demonstrated through a formal, active coalition or lobby 
group.
Stakeholder 1 was heavily involved in lobbying for radiation 
therapy services and stated that there was a considerable 
feeling in the NW that they miss out because they don’t 
have a critical mass. The participant stated that forcing NW 
residents to travel for radiation treatment was unfair and 
that a local service needed to be built to deliver equity. ‘If 
people needed to come from Melbourne to Burnie for treatment 
an hour’s flight and back is less than having to go through to 
Launceston or Hobart. So there is a possibility of expanding the 
clientele’. To summarise, their argument was that people
from the NW should not be made to travel to Launceston 
(being as little as 50 minutes away) but that people from 
Victoria could travel to NW Tasmania to receive treatment 
and that this was acceptable. This points to the irrationality 
and contradictory nature of some beliefs, consistent with 
the notion of boundedly rational decision-making.
Interestingly, not all the patients interviewed showed a 
strong sense of localism. Indeed, some were quite vocal in 
their opposition. One patient stated: 
‘Regional parochialism has, for want of a better word, 
buggered the hospital system in Tasmania… They’ve 
wasted so much money where they could have a damn 
good helicopter service.’ (Patient 12)
Discussion
The health and policy coalition could, in terms of bounded 
rationality, be seen as the ‘scientific community’ in this 
particular health sphere. They were the medical professionals
and health bureaucrats who understood intimately the 
service and its complexities. The Tasmania Government 
(as a state health policy actor) should therefore have been 
both a coalition member as well as a policy maker, thereby 
strengthening the link between the ‘scientific community’ 
and the decision-making authority. This was true in essence. 
However the Federal Government’s takeover of the issue in 
the 2010 Federal Election, by committing Federal funding 
for a state responsibility, changed the dynamics so that the 
true policymaking power lay with the most hierarchically 
superior level of government.
The absence of a second coalition to lobby for policy change 
leads to the question of whether change was agitated for 
by something or someone other than a consumer coalition. 
There is a possible role of the media in framing and 
promoting the issue of radiation therapy services, giving the 
impression of widespread community support when little 
more than general community interest existed. Or it could 
even be that the media, in a demonstration of bounded 
rationality, stated that there was a community desire for this 
radiation therapy service. However, in reality there is little 
evidence of having been a ‘community desire’ at all when it 
came to this issue.
In terms of understanding the actions of policymakers, 
bounded rationality can be seen. Acting on the desire to be 
elected or re-elected, the political parties vying for power 
in the 2010 Federal Election gathered enough information 
to form the basis of a decision, one that could win public 
support. This decision was that the community desired a 
radiation therapy service in the NW and that building a 
service in that region was the pre-packaged solution. Other 
alternatives, regardless of how clearly they were articulated 
or how strongly these were promoted by the ‘experts’ in the 
field, could not find traction in the midst of this boundedly 
rational decision-making.
But would this change have occurred without the 
intervention of the Federal Government? The evidence here 
is mixed. On one hand, Braddon was a marginal seat in what
was going to be a close election. On the other hand, funding 
had previously been concentrated on the Launceston 
service, including a 2007 commitment that led to a third 
linear accelerator there. Significantly, discussion over 
the possible funding of radiation therapy services only 
became noticeable after a petition was presented to State 
Parliament in 2010 on the eve of a public forum in the lead 
up to the election. This indicates that the move from no 
radiation therapy to a radiation therapy service reached a 
marked increase in momentum during the Federal election 
campaign of 2010, after no clear timeline from the State 
Government for achieving this change. Indeed, part of the 
decision to place a third linear accelerator in Launceston, 
rather than establishing a service in the NW, had come down 
to issues of sustainability and recruitment, indicating the 
State Government concurred with the views of the health 
community. [13] Therefore, change was clearly instigated at 
a Federal level.
Understanding the reality of bounded rationality in 
policymaking allows health professionals and those involved 
in health policy to be more strategic in what they say and 
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when they say it. As Cairney [11] states, there is no one point 
in the policy process at which scientists or experts can step 
in and have a significant effect on the outcome. The process 
is more chaotic, more emotive and less logical than that. By
understanding the limitations to a policymaker’s 
receptiveness to new information, even in the face of credible 
new information, health experts can target messages more
effectively.
Skinner [15] discusses the idea of being more strategic using 
the concept of  ‘defensive localism’ to discuss proposed 
changes to local health networks in Canada. Some of the 
networks affected, rather than fighting the changes, used 
the opportunity to secure additional funding in return for 
their acquiescence. Therefore, if health professionals or 
managers could frame the issue in terms of what the affected 
groups might be able to secure or gain if they supported 
evidence-based changes then these groups might take 
that opportunity. Likewise, health professionals and 
management might realise that their organisations are the 
ones needing to acquiesce and could use this understanding 
to bargain for a better outcome. The consequence of using 
this understanding and being more strategic with policy 
actions may well mean a more safe and sustainable service 
for patients, even if that patient group is seemingly lobbying 
for a different outcome.
Conclusion
This paper has examined how political strategy used to 
win support in a marginal seat during a marginal election 
reveals the use of boundedly rational decision-making in 
the establishment of radiation therapy services. The efforts 
of the scientific community, namely health bureaucrats 
and health professionals, were to highlight the lack of 
sustainability and safety in such a service and the ongoing 
issues of recruiting and retaining specialist oncology and 
radiation therapy staff. The Tasmanian Government had also 
refrained from moving forward on establishing a radiation 
therapy service in the NW for the same reasons. It was not 
until the commitments made by the Federal Government 
in 2010 that the Tasmanian Government was left with no 
choice but to proceed.
Yet, the decision to commit funding does not appear to be 
based on any evidence presented that there was a need 
for this service in the NW region. The evidence, indeed, 
supported the contrary. What was evident was a sense 
of localism in the region that made the establishment of 
radiation therapy services a pre-packaged solution aimed at
meeting the aspirational objectives of the Federal 
Government to be re-elected in 2010. This article provides 
health service professionals and managers with an 
opportunity to understand the political, boundedly rational 
motivations that underpin policy change and the incorporate 
this understanding into their own policy objectives.
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